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Abstract: Objectives. Starting from the idea that tax equity requirements, administration costs and 
the tendency towards tax evasion determine the design of tax systems, it is important to identify a 
satisfactory efficiency/equity deal in order to build a tax system as close to optimum requirements as 
possible.  Prior Work Previous studies proved that an optimum tax system is that through which it 
will be collected a level of tax revenues which will satisfy budgetary demands, while losing only a 
minimum ‘amount’ of welfare. In what degree the Romanian tax system meets these requirements? 
Approach We envisage analyzing the possibilities of improving Romanian tax system as to come 
nearest to optimum requirements. Results We can conclude fiscal system can uphold important 
improvements in what assuring tax equity is concerned, resulting in raising the degree of free 
conformation in the field of tax payment and, implicitly, the degree of tax efficiency. Implications 
Knowing to what extent it can be acted upon in the direction of finding that satisfactory 
efficiency/equity deal may allow oneself to identify the blueprint of a tax system in which the loss of 
welfare is kept down to minimum. Value For the Romanian institutions empowered to impose taxes, 
the knowledge of the possibilities of making the tax system more efficient can be important while 
aiming at reducing the level of evasion phenomenon. 
Keywords: horizontal and vertical equity; optimal commodity taxation; optimal income taxation; 
excess burden; welfare economics; tax evasion  
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1 Introduction 
A problem that is today in the attention of many economists and that should be 
carefully analyzed by authorities, concerns the design of an optimal tax system or, 
rather, the improvement of the tax system, to bring it closer to the requirements of 
optimal taxation. 
Optimal tax theory is the study of how best to design a tax to minimize distortion 
and inefficiency subject to raising set revenues through distorsionary taxation. 
(Ljungqvist & Sargent, 2000) 
To meet such requirements, modern tax systems should be designed and must 
function based on commonly accepted requirements. The most important 
requirements in this respect are the fairness of the tax system and its efficiency.  
Efficiency, which is traditionally the purview of economics, and does not involve 
ethical and normative judgment, considers only how resources are allocated, while 
equity considers the distribution of resources and required to refer to social norms 
and value judgment. 
As regards the two fundamental requirements of an optimal tax system, there 
should be noted that, most of the times, meeting the terms of such requirement 
involves the acceptance of a particular compromise while meeting the conditions of 
the second one. 
According to the opinions of theoretician economists of Romania (Văcărel, 2003), 
ensuring tax fairness presupposes the fulfillment of four cumulative conditions: 
- To determine a minimum tax, applicable to direct taxes on individuals’ income; 
- General application of taxes and duties by eliminating tax incentives granted to 
certain categories of taxpayers; 
- To determine the tax burden according to the contributive power (vertical 
equity); 
- To determine the same tax burden at the same level of contributive power 
(horizontal equity). 
In terms of tax return or efficiency, theoretician economists of Romania consider 
that taxes should be collected with minimal expenditure aiming at obtaining a 
higher amount of revenue to the state budget (Hoanţă, 2000). Thus, ensuring the 
highest possible tax efficiency involves the fulfillment of the following three 
cumulative conditions: 
- To ensure the universality of taxation, namely to levy taxes from all individuals 
and legal entities and the entire taxable domain;  
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- To minimize the cost of establishing the taxable domain, calculation and 
collection of taxes;  
- To minimize the opportunities for tax avoidance (legal and illegal means) of 
part of the taxable domain.  
These three conditions regarding the taxation’s efficiency are supplemented by the 
need of ensuring a fair tax treatment, which we consider very important for 
increasing the willingness to pay taxes and, thus, to ensure the highest efficiency of 
taxation. In these circumstances, we can say that tax efficiency does not always 
determine the reduction of tax return but, on the contrary, it may increase its 
capacity, equity and efficiency becoming, thus, interdependent conditions in 
creating an optimal tax system.  
In the literature, in close contact with the two requirements mentioned above, 
especially with the tax equity requirement, the tax neutrality requirement is also 
approached. In accordance with this, taxes should not affect taxpayers' behavior 
and resource allocation. However, although a neutral tax avoids distortion and 
inefficiency completely (Rothbard, 1970), it remains a theoretical tax as long as, 
most of the times, tax tools are used by interventionist governments to correct the 
inefficiency of certain economic operators and, in general, to reach economic, 
social and political goals, etc.   
 
2 Optimal Indirect Taxation 
In terms of optimal indirect taxation, in the early twentieth century, the American 
economist Frank Ramsey outlined a theory of optimal taxation of products and 
services, advocating for their differential taxation. The question that Ramsey tried 
to answer concerns the tools a government uses to tax various goods and services 
so that, given budgetary constraints, the loss of welfare caused by the tax system to 
be minimal and thus to meet the conditions for taxation efficiency. 
The conclusion reached is that, to minimize total excess burden, tax rates should be 
set so that the tax-induced percentage reduction in the quantity demanded of each 
commodity is the same (Ramsey, 1927).  
In other words, efficient requires that relatively high rates of taxation be levied on 
relatively inelastic goods (Rosen & Gayen, 2010). 
The question is whether such a mode of taxation of goods and services considered 
effective, is, at the same time, fair.  
If in direct taxation, equity can be ensured, as we shall see below, either using 
proportional taxation, or the progressive one, in terms of indirect taxation, it is 
recognized as being (at least in the way which is applied today in modern tax 
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systems) deeply unfair, and that is because these taxes, through their application, 
weigh heavier on the shoulders of people with lower income. In other words, the 
tax burden, for such taxes, is decreasing in relation to the income meant for 
consumption.  
To explain this, we consider two persons: P1 and P2, who have the following 
income available for consumption: V1=1000 u.m. and V2=10000 u.m. Both 
persons buy the same product for which they pay a price of 500 u.m., taxed with 
10%. The indirect tax owed by each person is approximately 50 u.m., but the tax 
pressure borne by P1 [(50/1000)*100=5%] will be 4.5 p.p. higher than the one 
borne by P2 [(50/10000)*100] = 0.5%. 
Returning to the efficiency requirement set out by Ramsey, the question is whether 
consumption can be taxed differently depending on certain characteristics of goods, 
in this case, the elasticity of their demand. 
Excise (special consumption taxes) is an example in this respect, as it is generally 
applied to those categories of goods that have inelastic demand for consumption, 
hence the high efficiency of this type of tax. 
Can this criterion be applied for general consumption tax? 
If, through the application of differential taxation, indirect taxation becomes 
effective, does it become, at the same time, more equitable? 
In general, goods with inelastic demand, are either those for basic necessities (basic 
food) or those that have no substitutes in consumption. Should they be taxed at 
higher rates? 
For example, if a person with low income allocates most of the revenues to buy 
basic food (bread, milk, etc.), while another person with high income allocates 
most of their income to the purchase goods such as: perfumes, fur coats, luxury car 
fuel and the like, the consumption of the two categories of goods should be taxed at 
the same rate, as high as possible to ensure greater efficiency? The answer is 
obviously no. Welfare economics focuses on the usefulness the assets have in use. 
Therefore, even though the two categories of goods have inelastic demand for 
consumption, the taxation of necessities should be made in order to ensure a fair 
taxation based on lower tax rates. 
Resuming the example above, if P1 buys only basic goods, in amount of 900 u.m., 
levied with 10%, this person will bear a tax pressure of 9% while P2 buys goods in 
amount of 9000 u.m., levied at the same rate, bearing the same tax pressure of 9%. 
If the goods bought by P2 were differently taxed, depending on their type of 
category, namely goods in amount of 900 u.m., taxed with 10% and goods in 
amount of 5000 u.m., taxed with 20%, the tax pressure borne by P2 would be 
12.9%, 2.9 p.p. higher than the one borne by P1 and it would be broadly correlated 
with the contributive power of taxpayers.  
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Therefore, the application of the value added tax in Romania is highly unfair given 
that, with few exceptions which usually do not concern basic goods, the taxation 
rate is the same for the rest of categories of goods and services subject to taxation.  
 
3 Optimal Direct Taxation  
As regards direct taxation, one of the most important such taxes is the income tax, 
tax with a substantial contribution to the formation of public financial resources 
and with important implications for decision of individual taxpayers to use their 
available time to work or to spend it as free time (leisure). 
The way in which income is taxed is one of the most controversial issues in public 
finance. 
One of the models which attempted to analyze the optimal taxation of income is the 
model devised by Fracis Ysidro Edgeworth (Rosen & Gayen, 2010). The model is 
based on the following assumptions: 
- Individuals have utility functions based on their income, such functions increase 
with the income, but based on decreasing rates; 
- Considering budgetary constraints, the optimal tax system is the one which 
manages to maximize total social welfare W, as sum of individual utilities (U1, U2 
…., Un) 
- W = U1+U2+….Un, where n is the number of the persons in the society;  
- The total amount of the available income is fixed.  
Edgeworth believes that to maximize social welfare, individual utilities must 
become equal by taxation, but the conditions under which the utility function of 
people with higher income, has higher values, then such income should be taxed 
more, namely with higher tax rates. To ensure tax fairness, these rates would apply 
only to the corresponding utility of income which exceeds the equalized utility for 
all individuals.  
In other words, the model hereby upholds the progressive taxation of income, 
because, through taxation, the welfare loss will be higher for the rich and lower for 
the poor, thus their utility functions would equalize. 
The main criticism of the model is that the amount of available income in society is 
fixed, or in circumstances, where, for equalizing the utilities, the marginal tax rate 
for the highest income would reach 100%, individuals will refrain from activities 
generating that part of income to be seized, therefore the total amount of available 
income will be reduced. 
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Given that the optimal taxation system distorts labor decisions and leads to welfare 
loss, marginal taxation rate should be lower than 100%. Thus, the theory states that 
an optimal tax policy should maintain tax pressure within the admissible area of the 
Laffer curb.    
In 1987, Nicholas Stern studied a similar taxation system. He suggested for the 
income collected from a person to be determined as follows: 
Collected tax income = -α + t * Individual income, where t is the taxation rate, and 
α may be the minimum non-taxable income. 
According to this model, when the individual model is 0, individuals should 
receive subsidies from the government equal toα. The subsidy to be received is the 
difference α - t * Individual income. Thus, the individuals are tempted to wait for 
the governmental subsidies and thus labor is not encouraged.  
J. Gruber and E. Saez (2002) undertook much more interesting analyses and 
suggested a taxation system based on the use of progressive rates. The advantage of 
such a model is that the tax paid in absolute amount, increases along with the 
income and individuals, having lower tax rates, could manifest an increased 
demand for employment and to generate taxable income, perhaps with positive 
consequences as regards tax evasion.  
An alternative to income tax, thought to remove the distortions generated by 
progressive taxation, is taxation on ability, the ability of individuals to generate 
income. This tax alternative takes into account that progressive taxation may cause 
people with high capacity of earning large revenue to refrain from certain 
activities. Moreover, it is also the main criticism by supporters of proportional rate, 
progressive taxation.  
In terms of revenue the state needs, such a solution could be interesting as far as 
not to create opportunities for tax evasion, but tax authorities find it difficult to 
identify such abilities and, thus, this variation is still at the stage of hypothesis. 
Moreover, by applying such a tax system would somehow arrive at some kind of 
tax "per capita" and certainly, for certain categories of people, it would lead to 
income confiscation.  
The lump-sum tax is another topic approached in related literature. As N.G. 
Mankiw, M. Weinzierl and D. Yagan (2009) mentioned, in the absence of market 
imperfections, the optimal tax system is the one that does not make changes of the 
taxpayer. Given that the tax distorts economic decisions, a loss of wealth is created 
and therefore a reduction in existing social welfare before tax, the lump-sum tax 
could be a solution.  
Lump-sum taxes can be built with or without taking into account the size of income 
received. In the first case, they are deeply unfair and create an increase in the 
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relative tax burden for people with low income. In the second case, given that they 
still can be called so, lump-sum taxes do not meet the conditions of non-distortion 
and thus cannot be considered optimal.  
Returning to the lump-sum tax in its pure form, established without taking into 
account the size of income or other criteria, as mentioned above, it fails to comply 
with tax fairness requirements, namely the establishment of the tax burden on the 
power of contribution, individuals or families with low income finish bearing the 
much higher relative value than high-income individuals or families.  
Because of the distortions generated in terms of tax fairness, lump-sum taxes are 
little used by modern tax systems1. 
The current Romanian tax system uses various forms of lump-sum taxes.   
An alternative is the lump-sum tax, in its pure form, found in the case of certain 
income obtained by various categories of taxpayers from independent activities. 
The tax, which does not take into account the size of yield, as determined 
administratively by other criteria such as type of activity, venue, taxpayer age, etc. 
creates under legal ways, wide possibilities of tax evasion with consequences to 
ensure equal and fair treatment at the level of taxpayers who receive income from 
independent activities, but also to other taxpayers subject to income tax.  
A second variant of the lump-sum tax, common for all income from self-
employment, is where the taxable income is determined by taking into account the 
expenses set by the fiscal authorities in flat-rate system. In these circumstances, 
taxpayers who, in fact, record lower expenses than those set out in the lump-sum 
system will avoid the taxation of a statutory part of the taxable material. But those 
whose costs exceed the costs set in the lump-sum system will have to bear a higher 
tax. In reality, this type of tax is optional; the consequences over the state budget 
may be insignificant.  
The third option of lump-sum tax was introduced in Romania in May 2009. It was 
applied to personal income (profit tax and small enterprise tax), being rather a 
minimum tax, namely taxpayers pay a profit tax, calculated on the basis of 
proportionate rate of 16% but not less than the minimum tax revenue set in the 
previous fiscal year.  
Having been established according to the revenue obtained in the previous fiscal 
year, the tax did not account for the contributive power of the taxpayers, and the 
moment of its implementation was poorly decided (the economic crisis hit 
Romania) and led to an unjustified increase of the tax burden for some taxpayers 
and the decapitalization of others. The tax was abolished in September 2010.  
                                                          
1
 A variant of this “per capita” of the lump-sum tax led to the resignation of the Margaret Thatcher 
Government, in 1990. 
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4. Conclusions 
Although tax fairness can sometimes increase the efficiency of tax revenue, in 
terms of increasing voluntary payment compliance, fairness and efficiency, as the 
main requirements of an optimal tax system, are difficult to implement in practice, 
all and at the same time. Therefore, the tax system, as a system of coercion, will 
never be neither effective nor fair to all taxpayers. 
Studies carried out in time in the field of taxation, have tried to bring more fiscal 
fairness under a given level of efficiency or to maximize social welfare by reducing 
its costs (excess burden) at a given level of fairness. 
However, the optimization of the tax system remains still an open question for both 
academics and for policymakers when making decisions about shaping the tax 
system. 
Given the analysis hereby, in our opinion, the Romanian tax system can withstand 
changes in terms of improving its fairness, with consequences over the increase of 
the payment compliance of taxpayers. 
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